Political Hazards, Experience, and Sequential Entry Strategies: The International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980–1998 by Delios, Andrew & Henisz, Witold J
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers Wharton Faculty Research
11-2003
Political Hazards, Experience, and Sequential Entry
Strategies: The International Expansion of Japanese
Firms, 1980–1998
Andrew Delios
Witold J. Henisz
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the
International Business Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/54
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Delios, A., & Henisz, W. J. (2003). Political Hazards, Experience, and Sequential Entry Strategies: The International Expansion of
Japanese Firms, 1980–1998. Strategic Management Journal, 24 (11), 1153-1164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.355
Political Hazards, Experience, and Sequential Entry Strategies: The
International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980–1998
Abstract
We find support for the role of experiential learning in the international expansion process by extending the
stages model of internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration of temporal and cross-
national variation in the credibility of the policy environment. Using a sample of 3857 international
expansions of 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, we build on the concepts of uncertainty and experiential
learning, to show that firms that had gathered relevant types of international experience were less sensitive to
the deterring effect of uncertain policy environments on investment. One implication of our results is that
research on international strategy should emphasize understanding the political institutions that constrain or
enable political actors, just as entry mode research has done. A second implication is that research in the stages
model of internationalization should give the same weight to the policy environment as a source of
uncertainty to a firm, as it has given to cultural, social and market institutions.
Keywords
stages model, internationalization, political risk, organizational learning, Japan
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | International Business
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/54
  
 
Political Hazards, Experience and Sequential Entry Strategies: The 
International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980 -1998 
 
 
ANDREW DELIOS 
Department of Business Policy 
National University of Singapore 
1 Business Link, Singapore 117592 
Tel: (65) 6874-3094  
Fax: (65) 6779-5059  
E-mail: andrew@nus.edu.sg 
 
and 
WITOLD J. HENISZ 
Department of Management 
The Wharton School 
2021 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370 
Tel: (215) 898-0788 
Fax: (215) 898-0401 
E-mail: henisz@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
 
 
 
September 12, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
* This research was supported by an RGC Grant (#HKUST6217/00H) and by a Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant (#410-2001-0143). We thank Lorraine Eden, Ram 
Mudambi, Nicolaj Siggelkow and seminar participants at the Stern School of Business at New York 
University for their insightful comments and Freek Vermeulen for providing data for cultural distance 
measurements.  
 1 
 
 
Political Hazards, Experience and Sequential Entry Strategies: The 
International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980 -1998 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  
 
We find support for the role of experiential learning in the international expansion process by 
extending the stages model of internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration of 
temporal and cross-national variation in the credibility of the policy environment. Using a sample of 
3,857 international expansions of 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, we build on the concepts of 
uncertainty and experiential learning, to show that firms that had gathered relevant types of 
international experience were less sensitive to the deterring effect of uncertain policy environments on 
investment. One implication of our results is that research on international strategy should emphasize 
understanding the political institutions that constrain or enable political actors, just as entry mode 
research has done. A second implication is that research in the stages model of internationalization 
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An extensive literature on corporate expansions based in the stages model of internationalization 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Luostarinen, 1980) examines how geographic distance and market, 
linguistic and cultural differences influence a firm’s international expansion process across countries. 
We seek to extend this literature on the stages model to incorporate insight into how the political 
environment influences choices about which markets to enter for firms with different levels and types 
of international investment experience. We make this extension because scholars emphasize that 
political hazards are a primary determinant of the likelihood of entry (Kobrin et. al. 1980). The stages 
model, however, has had a unitary focus in defining foreign market uncertainty as extending from 
cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1996). The omission of political hazards in extant stages models 
leaves these models incomplete and, as we find, could lead to poor empirical support for its main 
conjectures. Including the political environment in the stages model does not require an alteration of 
its core concepts – uncertainty and experiential learning – but it does require a multifaceted rather 
than unitary conceptualization of a nation’s institutional environment. 
In a stages model that omits consideration of the political environment, firms would be 
expected to move across markets of similar culture with relative ease. For example, firms would be 
expected to move sequentially from Singapore to Malaysia and Indonesia, from Chile to Peru and 
Paraguay or from Hungary to the Czech and Slovak Republics. Many firms did follow such patterns, 
but others held back noting that while similar in terms of markets and culture, these national markets 
differed in their political environments.   
The empirical specification we develop to test for such patterns in foreign entry sequences 
extends the stages model while contributing to prior work on the deterring effect of uncertainty in the 
political environment (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001) and the influence of 
experience on patterns of internationalization (Erramilli, 1991; Barkema et al., 1996; Delios  & 
Beamish, 2001). We refine the concept of international experience to develop specific profiles of 
experience that should be of particular importance to overcoming the uncer tainty that we model in our 
empirical setting.  This study thus provides a better understanding of the sources of uncertainty in 
national institutional environments and identifies specific ways in which a firm  sequences its 
expansion to minimize the uncerta inty that it encounters in each FDI entry.  
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BACKGROUND 
International expansion in the stages model is a process rooted in uncertainty reduction through the 
accumulation of relevant types of experience (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Experience in a host 
country, for example, provides important information about its business environment (Luostarinen, 
1980) thereby reducing uncertainty, and enabling a firm to make a better evaluation of potential future 
expansions (Barkema et al., 1996). Investment experience broadens a firm's perception of its 
alternatives and increases the extent of its search (Cyert & March, 1963). The accumulation of 
international investment experience is reflected in two sequences of foreign entry: one from culturally 
and geographically close countries to more distant ones  (Davidson, 1980), and one for a firm’s 
investment path in a country, from exporting, to distribution, to joint venture manufacturing and 
finally wholly-owned manufacturing (Davidson, 1980). 
These two sequences stem from a reduction in knowledge and skill barriers to foreign 
expansion that can accompany the accumulation of international experience (Henisz and Delios, 2001; 
Delios & Beamish, 1999). Yet, within the aggregate measure of international experience, firms can 
have diverse experience profiles that le ad to different levels of learning about national environments, 
and hence different levels of uncertainty about those environments. Disaggregating experience into  
fine-grained profiles may be necessary to identify its effects on a firm’s entry strategy. For example, 
previous research demonstrates that experience gained in specific settings such as a subsidiary’s 
industry, or the nation in which a subsidiary is sited, minimizes the deterring influence of political 
hazards on entry modes (Delios & Henisz, 2000), and reduces a firm’s tendency to follow the FDI 
entry location and entry mode decisions of other firms (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Lu, 2001). National 
experience, however, does not dimin ish the negative influence of political hazards on FDI entry rates 
(Henisz & Delios, 2001). One question that motivates this paper is therefore “Are there specific types 
of experience that can reduce the influence of political hazards on rates of FDI entry?”. 
We introduce this question in the context of the stages model in which researchers have built 
on the concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) to demonstrate expansion paths by 
which firms acquire knowledge and develop skills applicable to new investment environments. Firms, 
for example, tend to learn more effectively about new cultures from experience gathered in the host 
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country or related settings, than from experience gathered in distant cultural settings (Barkema et al., 
1996). Learning is also more effective when a firm follows a succession of incremental steps that 
build its knowledge base, expand its absorptive capacity, and thereby enable learning in more 
dissimilar environments (Barkema et al., 1997). Hence, experience is likely to provide the greatest 
benefits to a firm engaged in international expansion when it is gained sequentially, in steps that 
maximize opportunities to learn about specific dimensions of national environments, while 
minimizing the extent of uncertainty a firm encounters in its international expa nsions. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The stages model is an intuitively appealing model that has received strong support in qualitative 
work looking at the decisions made in the early stages of a firm’s expansion (Sullivan & 
Bauerschmidt, 1990). Quantitative empirical work has, however, been less supportive (Turnbull, 
1987). We suggest this weakness in the model comes from its relatively narrow conception of 
international differences as stemming from cultural and market differences. The stages model focus 
on culture and markets does not emerge as a weakness when the choice set of countries for expansion 
is constrained to geographically nearby countries in which the structures of policymaking institutions 
are similar as was the case for the European expansions undertaken by Northern European firms 
captured by early research on the stages model (Nordström, 1991). When most countries in the world 
and the concomitant wide variance in national institutional environments are considered, however, the 
model has its greatest difficulty in explaining cross-country expansion sequences, perhaps again 
because of the omission of measures of the political environment. 
Political Hazards, Experience and Across-Country Expansion 
The ability of a government to credibly commit to a giv en set of policies is of substantial 
interest to a firm's international expansion strategy (Kobrin et al., 1980). Where policy credibility is 
low, firms minimize commitments to a market, or avoid investment (Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
Uncertainty from the public policy environment magnifies difficulties in collecting, interpreting and 
organizing the information necessary for a successful entry by foreign direct investment (FDI), 
increasing the relative costs of FDI, and increasing hurdle rates of return. When policymakers can act 
unilaterally or have high certainty that a subservient or allied legislature and judicial branch will 
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support their actions, future policies are likely to be particularly volatile in response to exogenous 
shocks, to changes in the identity of policymakers or to changes in the preferences of existing 
policymakers. Changes that are the result of direct lobbying by host country competitors or 
incumbents are of particular concern to a firm making an international expansion. We refer to 
countries characterized by such policymaking structures as politically hazardous.  
Although the assertion that firms will eschew politically hazardous markets is not 
controversial, a stages model perspective would suggest that a firm’s sensitivity to political hazards 
would vary in its profile of prior experience, particularly where that experience profile assists a firm 
in minimizing the operational impact of political hazards. One such important capability is that to 
detect and safeguard against opportunistic  behavior on the part of a host country government or by 
partners, buyers, suppliers and competitors that may seek to influence a host country government 
(Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz 2000a). Such learning can be applied to develop strategies that 
mitigate future public and private expropriation hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000).  
As with learning about culture (Barkema et al., 1996), experience is likely to have its most 
profound effect on uncertainty reduction, when it is gained in a setting similar to the one in which a 
FDI entry is being contemplated. Consequently, we expect that a firm with greater levels of 
experience in environments characterized by a high level of political hazards will have developed 
more appropriate experience and learning for dealing with uncertainty endemic to other politically 
hazardous countries and therefore display less sensitivity to a country’s level of political hazards.  
Hypothesis 1: A firm's stock of experience in politically hazardous countries moderates the 
negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry into that country.  
 
A firm’s ability to overcome uncertainty in politically hazardous environments also depends 
on its ability to focus attention on the resulting managerial challenges relative to other sources of 
difficulty such as those associated with market or cultural uncertainty.  Learning about international 
operations is an inherently incremental process, which can be most effective when it occurs in a series 
of sequential steps (Barkema et al., 1996). Consequently firms are likely to follow sequential 
expansion paths that minimize the requisite amount of new knowledge and learning. If uncertainty 
about a culture and the policy environment are both high, a substantial amount of learning is required, 
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and the difficulties found in mounting a successful investment are magnified. FDI entry is thus less 
likely. Once learning has occurred over one dimension of this uncertainty, such as cultur e, uncertainty 
in the other, is less likely to  deter FDI entry. This idea is similar to a double -layered acculturation 
process in which differences in national and corporate cultures impose a barrier to learning in, and the 
success of, foreign expansions (Barkema et al., 1996). Accordingly, we expect that when a firm has 
experience with a given culture, it will be better prepared to enter a country in the same cultural block 
with high policy uncertainty, and hence display less sensitivity to political hazards when 
contemplating entering by a foreign subsidiary. 
Hypothesis 2: A firm's stock of experience in countries within the same cultural block 
moderates the negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry 
into that country. 
 
We next consider the efficacy of accumulated experience across types of FDI entry. The 
stages model identifies a distribution subsidiary as being a suitable mode for learning about local 
customers and local culture. The suitability extends from the close contact a distribution facility  
engenders betw een a firm and its consumers. Close contact is essential to acquiring experiential 
knowledge about "…cultural patterns, structure of the market system, and more importantly, 
characteristics of individual customer firms…" (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977: 28). The close contacts are 
gained through a marketing interface, which creates linkages between a firm and its customers. 
Although the decision to enter by either a manufacturing or a distribution subsidiary involves the 
deliberation of a firm’s senior management, distribution subsidiaries have a lower commitment of 
financial and human resources (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Further, senior managers associated with 
marketing and logistics functions are the ones most likely to be assigned to a distribution subsidiary.  
The minimal commitment of senior management in a distribution subsidiary may impose 
limitations to learning about political hazards. A distribution subsidiary is oriented and structured to 
acquire information about markets and culture in a host country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). As a low 
commitment mode of entry, it is not likely that a firm making a distribution entry will be heavily 
involved in negotiations and bargaining with a host country government. This contrasts to the case of 
entry by a manufactur ing facility which likely involves extensive negotiations along a number of 
dimensions. Engaging in communications with local authorities for the negotiation of land for a plant, 
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contracting for employees, arranging the regulatory or tax concessions for an investment, or securing 
necessary licenses and permits for international trade and the repatriation of dividends, can help a 
firm’s managers gain an understanding of the political process in a nation (Hillman et al., 1999). As 
the political process in most countries is highly complex in which the outcomes of political behavior 
are difficult to evaluate (Boddewyn, 1988), unless linkages are created to insiders in the political 
process, it is difficult for a firm to understand the rules in a political system, and the dynamics 
involved in the current issues (Hillman et al., 1999). The cross-functional expertise that accompanies 
a manufacturing entry, as well as its comparatively greater extent of association and communication 
with local authorities, relative to a distribution entry, makes it more likely to yield insight into these 
political processes. Such features  likely make the accrual of political hazard mitigation capabilities 
greater for manufacturing experience than for distribution experience.  
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s stock of experience in the operation of overseas manufacturing plants 
moderates the negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry 
into that country. 
METHODS 
Setting, Data Sources and Sample 
We test these hypotheses using panel data on the international expansion of Japanese firms. 
Japanese firms are a suitable empirical context because they have been a leading investor worldwide 
in the 1980s and 1990s (UNCTAD, 2001). By 1999, more than 100 countries had received Japanese 
FDI, with 54 countries possessing at least 30 Japanese FDIs. This provides the country-level variance 
required to test the effects of political hazards, while controlling for other economic influences.  
We derived our sample from the 1,898 manufacturing firms listed on the first and second 
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of 1997.  We matched this list of firms with the foreign 
subsidiary data found in the 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 1999 editions of Toyo Keizai's annual 
compendium of foreign investment, Japanese Overseas Investment. An edition reputedly contains a 
complete listing of the stock of each firm's foreign subsidiaries in the year in which it was published 
(Yamawaki, 1991; Henisz and Delios, 2001). This process yielded 5,894 instances in which a firm 
had made at least one foreign investment in a host country of which only 94 were lost to casewise 
deletion due to missing data on political hazards (Henisz, 2000b) or various economic and 
demographic indicators (World Bank). For the final sample, we needed to be concerned with host 
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country-firm pairs in which there was left censoring in the subsidiary foundation history. As few 
Japanese subsidiaries tend to be divested in the first few years of operations (Delios & Beamish, 
2001), we set initial subsidiary entry not prior to 1980 as our starting date and removed all host 
country-firm pairs in which a firm made an FDI entry prior to 1980. After this, we had 3,857 cases in 
which a Japanese firm had made at least one FDI in a host country.  
Measures 
Our dependent variable was an indicator variable, Exit, that took a value of 1 if firm x made an 
entry in country i  at time t, otherwise it was zero. Observations started in 1980, continued until an 
entry occurred, or were right-censored in 1999, if Exi t was zero in every year t for firm x in country i. 
An entry was a foreign direct investment, not a portfolio investment, that resulted in a firm’s first 
establishment of a foreign subsidiary in the focal host country. 
Political hazards. We take this annual time-varying measure from Henisz (2000b). It 
quantifies the extent to which any one institutional actor—e.g., the executive or a legislative 
chamber—in a given country is unconstrained in its choice of policies in a given year. The measure is  
constructed using a spatial model of political interaction that incorporates data on the number of 
independent veto players and their party affiliations . The main results of the derivation are that (1) 
each additional veto player  (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and 
controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a negative but diminishing effect on the 
total level of hazards, and (2) hazards decline in the homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences 
within an opposed (aligned) veto player .  
Cultural block distance. Following Barkema et al. (1996), we coded countries into Ronen and 
Shenkar's (1985) cultural blocks, then made an ordinal ranking of these blocks in terms of their 
comparative distance from Japan. The nearest cultural block to Japan was scored one, the next most 
proximate two, and so forth. Results were similar if we used a cultural distance measure.  
Investment experience.  Using all data we compiled on the history of a firm’s investment 
activity in all years, we computed several experience measures. We first calculated an International 
experience measure that comprised a firm’s experience gathered in all national settings and by all 
types of entry. We then decomposed international experience into various constituent types of 
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experience. We calculated the logarithm of a firm’s years of experience in the operation of 
subsidiaries in countries with above  (below) mean levels of political hazards (High (low) hazard 
country experience); in countries in the same (another) cultural block ((Other) Cultural block  
experience); and in manufacturing (distribution) entries (Manufacturing (distribution) experience).  
Interactions. To test the hypotheses we developed  six interaction terms. Each interaction w as 
the multiplicative sum of the mean-centered value for a category of political hazards and experience. 
For example, we computed the manufacturing experience*political hazards interaction for firm x in 
country i at time t by multiplying the mean-centered value of manufacturing experience in firm x in 
year t-1 by the mean-centered value of political hazards of country i in year t-1. 
Firm-level controls.  We included positive  correlates of FDI activity: firm size (Employment), 
technological assets (R&D intensity),  marketing assets (Advertising intensity), and export activity 
(Export intensity) (Caves, 1996). We included Country spread, a time-varying covariate of the 
number of countries in which a firm had foreign investments, to control for the competing hypothesis 
that FDI entry in a politically hazardous country is more likely by firms with diverse international 
production capabilities because these firms have a valid option to leave (Fagre & Wells, 1982). 
Country controls.  We had two measures of market size, GDP per capita and Population, and 
two of market potential, annual Population growth rate and annual GDP per capita growth rate  
(Caves, 1996). We measured a country's relative attractiveness for foreign trade (Trade, annual value 
of exports and imports over GDP) and for foreign investment (FDI, annual flow of FDI over GDP).  
Fixed effects. We included annual, country and industry indicator variables . We could not 
include firm indicator variables as this would expand the number of cells of data to about 500 million 
thus exceeding the memory capacity needed for model estimation.  Results were robust to a model 
with firm indicator variables for a sub-sample of the 127 firms that had entered 10 or more countries. 
Model 
We estimated FDI entry rates using event history analysis, which uses a longitudinal record of 
events in a sample from a population to examine the influences that a set of covariates have on the 
event being examined.  Our focal event is a firm’s first foreign subsidiary establishment in a host 
country. In the analysis, firm x is considered to be at risk of entering country i in each time period t, or 
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until an FDI entry occurs. We used an exponential model in which there is no age parametric 
dependence specified in the functional form of the model. This tec hnique models the rate of a 
transition from an origin state (e.g., no FDI entry) to a destination state (e.g., FDI entry) as a function 
of the covariates. Its general form is: 
rjk = exp (a jk0 + Ajk1a jk1 + Ajk 2a jk2…) 
where rjk is the transition rate from the origin state j to the destination state k, with the observed 
covariate vector Ajk, parameters to be estimated a jk, and constant a jk0. The estimation uses the 
maximum likelihood method (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995). In our specification, significant positive  
coefficient estimates indicate FDI entry rates increase when the covariate increases in value. 
To estimate this model, we took the base sample of 3,857 first entries by a firm in a country 
and expanded it into multiple spells that included all firm-country-year combinations among the 665 
firms, 68 countries and the annual time periods in which an investment could be made. In each spell, a 
firm was at risk of entering a country and was treated as right censored unless an FDI entry occurred. 
Once we divided the data into annual spells and removed combinations in which a nation or firm did 
not exist (e.g., pre-1986 observations for a firm founded in 1986), we had 816,908 observations.  
RESULTS  
Table 1 reports the FDI entry rate models. Model 1 presents the baseline estimation which includes 
annual, country and industry indicator variables , country and firm-level controls  and cultural distance. 
Model 2 adds political hazards as a main effect and interacted with international experience. Models 3 
to 8 test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. As multicollinearity could confound coefficient estimates for the 
experience measures  and the ir interactions with political hazards, we follow an established procedure 
of testing each hypothesis in a separate model (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Stable coefficient 
estimates across specifications and likelihood tests, in which we compare a model to its baseline, 
establish that the experience terms and interactions add new information to the model. 
 In the models, the hypotheses received strong statistical support and, more importantly given 
the very large sample size, the substantive or economic significance of the coefficient estimates was 
also quite strong (McCloskely & Ziliak, 1996). Model 1 presents a baseline specification which 
includes cultural block distance as the measure of uncertainty stemming from national differences. 
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Contrary to conventional stages models predictions (Barkema et al., 1996; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977), 
FDI entry rates were not related to a nation’s cultural block distance from Japan. When a cultural 
block distance*international experience interaction was added to model 1, its coefficient estimate w as 
negative, indicating FDI entry rates in culturally close countries became greater  with greater levels of 
international experience. These results hold when we define the sample as countries with below mean 
levels of political hazards, thus confining uncertainty to the cultural level. Independent of the 
consideration of political hazards, this result would suggest that Japanese firms’ sequence of country 
choice for international expansion did not follow the stages model. The insignificance of the 
international experience*political hazards interaction in model 2 supports our conjecture that 
international experience is too aggregate a measure to inform about the mechanisms by which it 
changes FDI entry rates.   
 For the results of the hypothesis tests, we confine our discussion to the economic significance 
of our results. Hypothesis 1 predicted that a firm's experience in high hazard countries would 
moderate the negative effect of political hazards on FDI entry rates. Consistent with that hypothesis, 
firms with high experience in hazardous countries (one standard deviation above the mean level of 
experience – 36 years) had a predicted probability of enter ing another hazardous country 58.5 percent 
greater than a firm with no experience in hazardous countries. Similar increases in the probability of 
entry were observed for countries at the mean level or with low levels of political hazards. This 
relationship differs substantively from the effect of firm-level experience in low hazards countries, in 
which the effect on FDI entry rates into low hazards countries was nearly three times larger than in 
politically hazardous countries (a change of 147.5 versus 59.2 percent). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that experience in a cultural block would moderate the deterring effect 
of political hazards on entries in that block. Moving from a cultural block experience level of zero, to 
a high experience leve l (one standard deviation above the mean – 8 years) increased the predicted 
probability of FDI entry by 14.1 percent in a low hazards setting, which was less than the 19.0 percent 
increase in a high hazards setting. Meanwhile, experience in other cultural blocks did not moderate 
the influence of political hazards. At all levels of experience in other cultural blocks, FDI entry rates 
in low hazards countries were 18.9 percent greater than those in high hazard countries. 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted a moderating role for manufacturing experience on the negative 
relationship between political hazards and FDI entry. Manufacturing experience contributes positively 
to FDI entry probabilities in high hazards settings . A firm with a high level (55 years) of 
manufacturing experience had a 75.8 percent increase in the predicted probability of FDI entry when 
political hazards were high, compared to a 29.9 percent increase when political hazards were low. 
Meanwhile, the accumulation of distribution experience resulted in a 41.0 percent increase in the 
predicted probability of FDI entry into low hazard countries, but a 12.0 percent decrease where 
political hazards were high.  We examined this result further by splitting the sample into two sub-
samples: first entries made by a distribution facility and first entries made by a manufacturing plant. 
The results show that manufacturing experience provides a similar positive moderation of political 
hazards for both distribution and manufacturing entries, with the negative moderating influence of 
distribution experience confined to manufacturing entries. 
DISCUSSION 
We have considered the effect of international experience of various types on the process of 
international expansion in a stages model we extended to include consideration of cross-national and 
temporal variation in the credibility of the policy environment. We find that firms that have followed 
a sequential process of international expansion exhibit a lower sensitivity to the deterring effect of 
political hazards. The results provide substantial corroborating evidence for the underlying theoretical 
premise of the stages model regarding the impact of uncertainty and accumulated experience on a 
firm’s ability to overcome national differences in institutional environments. Importantly, however, 
this corroborating evidence comes about when uncertainty emanating from the policy environment is 
modeled as part of national institutional variations. When we only considered the cultural 
environment, as in our model 1, Japanese firms seem to make investment decisions irrespective of the 
level of uncertainty in the host environment. This result for uncertainty stemming from the cultural 
environment, which contradicts conventional stages models predictions, might extend from an 
absence of close cultural counterparts to Japan (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985), where the contrast between 
close cultural counterparts and remote cultural countries provides a strong influence on foreign 
expansion patterns and outcomes (Barkema, et al 1996). 
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When we included the policy environment – specifically, a measure of the feasibility of 
policy change based upon the structure of political institutions; however, we found a robust 
relationship between the extent of policy uncertainty and FDI entry rates. We found evidence that a 
firm tried to minimize the amount of new information, and uncertainty, with which it must contend, 
by expanding into settings in which it is familiar with at least one dimension (political or cultural) of 
the institutional environment. Similarly, a f irm tries to accumulate experience in developing 
relationships between senior management and host country actors as occurs via direct investment in 
manufacturing operations, as made prior to entering hazardous countries. By contrast, the market and 
cultural based experience provided by a distribution facility is of the greatest assistance when entering 
low hazard environments. 
This study also advances research on experience effects in internationalization (Erramilli, 
1991) by moving beyond aggregate measures of experience, which may proxy for unobserved 
differences in a firm’s managerial competence, rather than the type of knowledge and skills 
acquisition necessary for a firm to expand in a sequential process. By showing that firms with greater 
levels of specific types of experience have higher rates of FDI entry into those countries where this 
experience is of particular value, our study reinforces the importance of measuring and testing 
experience effects in a way that aligns with the uncertainty that is to be overcome and the precise 
capabilities a firm needs to develop.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although this study was rich in its numbers of host countries  and firms and in the time period 
examined, it was limited to FDI entries by Japanese firms. The focus on Japanese firms creates a case 
in which there were not any countries in the same cultural block in Japan (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985), 
thereby deemphasizing the influence of the cultural dimension, while creating a greater emphasis on 
the policy environment. In this sense, the sample presents a strong case for testing the influence of the 
political dimension over the cultural dimension of national institutional environments. Another 
limitation is our simplification of multinational entry strategies to the decision to enter in isolation 
from other simultaneous decisions such as entry mode. Future work could refine both measures of the 
national institutional environment to encompass legal, political and electoral rules as well as our 
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measures of international experience so as to draw a tighter association between experience and 
learning. Refined measures and additional qualitative evidence could also show what specific 
techniques and strategies firms employ to overcome uncertainty in the policy environment. One step 
to reinforce the predictive validity of our measures is to examine the performance implications of 
decisions made by firms with differing experience levels (Barkema et al., 1996). Examining 
performance would help establish if the investment sequences we have identified increase the chances 
of making a successful FDI entry.  
Conclusion 
This study extended ideas based in a stages model of international expansion to incorporate a 
sophisticated perspective on the impact of uncertainty in a country’s policy environment on a firm’s 
expansion strategy. We highlight that specific types of experience plausibly generate the capabilities 
required for political hazard mitigation, which in turn influence the sensitivity of a firm’s rates of FDI 
entry to polic y uncertainty. The implication from a theoretical perspective is that the policy 
environment injects uncertainty into foreign markets independent of market and cultural 
environments, and this policy uncertainty should be considered in theoretical treatments and practical 
applications of sequential entry models. These theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence in 
support thereof bring the stages model of internationalization in closer concordance with the large 
body of empirical research emphasizing th e importance of political change and political processes for 
international expansion strategies across time. 
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TABLE 1 
Exponential Estimation of Rates of FDI Entry Across Countries a,b 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
FDI -3.429** 
(1.108) 
-3.436** 
(1.108) 
-3.391** 
(1.108) 
-3.343** 
(1.110) 
-3.613** 
(1.103) 
-3.633** 
(1.104) 
-3.618** 
(1.102) 
-3.660*** 
(1.103) 
Trade 0.414** 
(0.130) 
0.386** 
(0.131) 
0.381** 
(0.131) 
0.375** 
(0.131) 
0.377** 
(0.131) 
0.376** 
(0.131) 
0.397** 
(0.131) 
0.390** 
(0.131) 
Population c 2.175*** 
(0.360) 
2.207*** 
(0.360) 
2.207*** 
(0.361) 
2.211*** 
(0.360) 
2.160*** 
(0.362) 
2.151*** 
(0.363) 
2.229*** 
(0.361) 
2.232*** 
(0.361) 
Population growth -27.507*** 
(5.911) 
-29.357*** 
(6.048) 
-29.100*** 
(6.047) 
-29.171*** 
(6.046) 
-29.411*** 
(6.040) 
-29.399*** 
(6.040) 
-29.331*** 
(6.043) 
-29.342*** 
(6.043) 
GDP per capita c 
 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
-0.043** 
(0.015) 
-0.043*** 
(0.015) 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
-0.040** 
(0.015) 
-0.040** 
(0.015) 
-0.043** 
(0.015) 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
Cultural block distance 
 
0.133 
(0.517) 
0.119 
(0.517) 
0.118 
(0.517) 
0.115 
(0.517) 
0.121 
(0.519) 
0.128 
(0.519) 
0.118 
(0.518) 
0.117 
(0.517) 
GDP per capita growth -1.462** 
(0.463) 
-1.569*** 
(0.469) 
-1.602*** 
(0.469) 
-1.550*** 
(0.469) 
-1.356** 
(0.465) 
-1.353** 
(0.465) 
-1.412** 
(0.465) 
-1.410** 
(0.465) 
R&D intensity 7.204*** 
(0.866) 
7.214*** 
(0.866) 
6.942*** 
(0.868) 
6.967*** 
(0.868) 
7.005*** 
(0.870) 
7.022*** 
(0.871) 
7.496*** 
(0.868) 
7.543*** 
(0.868) 
Advertising intensity 3.352*** 
(0.970) 
3.355*** 
(0.970) 
3.126** 
(0.973) 
3.099** 
(0.973) 
2.972** 
(0.960) 
2.978** 
(0.960) 
3.092** 
(0.962) 
3.108** 
(0.961) 
Export intensity 1.152*** 
(0.111) 
1.152*** 
(0.111) 
1.107*** 
(0.112) 
1.112*** 
(0.112) 
1.287*** 
(0.109) 
1.292*** 
(0.110) 
1.270*** 
(0.111) 
1.271*** 
(0.111) 
Employment c 0.535*** 
(0.020) 
0.535*** 
(0.020) 
0.537*** 
(0.020) 
0.536*** 
(0.020) 
0.563*** 
(0.020) 
0.561*** 
(0.020) 
0.543*** 
(0.020) 
0.544*** 
(0.020) 
Country spread 0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
International experience c 0.172*** 
(0.016) 
0.178*** 
(0.020)      
 
Political hazards 
 
-0.187* 
(0.090) 
-0.172* 
(0.087) 
-0.242* 
(0.095) 
-0.185* 
(0.086) 
-0.239* 
(0.092) 
-0.178* 
(0.086) 
-0.200* 
(0.089) 
International experience c x 
Political hazards 
 -0.014 
(0.026)      
 
High hazard country 
experience c 
 
 
0.147*** 
(0.018) 
0.149*** 
(0.018)    
 
Low hazard country 
experience c 
  0.199*** 
(0.018) 
0.183*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
  
High hazard country 
experience c x Political hazards 
   0.018* 
(0.009) 
 
 
  
Low hazard country 
experience c x Political hazards 
   -0.141*** 
(0.040) 
    
Cultural block experience c     0.084*** 
(0.014) 
0.086*** 
(0.014)   
Other cultural blocks 
experience c 
    -0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.010 
(0.012)   
Cultural block experience c x 
Political hazards 
     0.036* 
(0.017) 
 
 
Other cultural blocks 
experience c x Political hazards 
     0.007 
(0.033) 
 
 
Manufacturing experience c     
  
0.098*** 
(0.013) 
0.119*** 
(0.014) 
Distribution experience c     
  
0.051*** 
(0.013) 
0.035* 
(0.014) 
Manufacturing experience c x 
Political hazards 
     
 
 0.141*** 
(0.030) 
Distribution experience c x 
Political hazards 
     
 
 -0.159*** 
(0.027) 
Model Indices         
Log likelihood 
Chi-square 
Change in chi-square 
Number of episodes 
Number of entries 
-20,450 
 12,320*** 
     --  
816,908 
    3,857 
 -20,447     
  10,326*** 
           6*** 
816,908 
    3,857 
-20,444 
 12,334*** 
      144***  
816,908 
    3,857 
-20,435 
 12,352*** 
        18***  
816,908 
    3,857 
-20,492 
  12,238*** 
         48*** 
816,908 
    3,857  
-20,489 
 12,244*** 
           6*** 
816,908 
    3,857 
-20,478 
 12,266*** 
        76***  
816,908 
    3,857 
-21,458 
 12,306*** 
        40***  
816,908 
    3,857 
Notes:  a *** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05  
b Nation, industry and annual fixed effects i ncluded in all models, but not reported.  
c Variable is a logarithm. 
 
